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Afterexploring both the crucial role ofthe interest elasticity
ofthe saving rate in the analysis of a wide variety of issues in economic —
particularlytax—policyand reasons why previous studies of the effect
of interest rates on consumption and saving have biased the estimated
elasticity toward zero, this study presents new estimates of consumption
functions based on aggregate U.S. time series data. The results are
striking: a variety of functional forn,estimatiOfl methodsand definitions
of the real after—tax rate of return invariably lead to the conclusion
of a substantial interest elasticity of saving.
The implications of this result for the analysis of the effi-
ciency and equity of the current U.S. tax treatment of incomefrom
capital are explored. In reducing the real net rate of return,current
tax treatment significantly retards capital accumulation.This in turn
causesanenormous waste of resources andredistributes a substantial
fractionof gross income from labor to capital. Rough estimates of the
lost welfare exceed fifty billion dollars peryear (a present value
closeto a trillion dollars!) and of the redistribution from labor to
capital exceed one quarter of capital's share of grossincome. This
suggests that exempting saving from the tax base (or equivalently,
allowing instantaneous depreciation of capital expenditures)could
substantially increase national income and welfare without transferring
income from workers to owners of capital. It also suggeststhat theusual calculatiorisof tax burdensby income class substantially over—
estimate both the progressivity of the income taxandthe alleged
regressivity of consumption taxes.
iiTaxation, Saving and the Rate of Interest*
Michael J. Boskin**
The effect of Interest rates on economic behavior, particularly on
saving and consumption, has been a central concern of economists at least
since the development of classical macroeconomics. Not only has the rate
of interest been viewed as the mechanism for equating saving and investment
in pre—Keynesian macroeconomic models, but it also has been at the center
of virtually all microeconomic models of Intertemporal consumer behavior.
It is thus curious that empirical studies of the effects of interest rates
on saving are few and farbetween.1 Most such studies conclude that interest
rates have only a negligible effect on consumption or saving.2
The notion that saving is perfectly interest inelastic has received
widespread acceptance among empirical and policy oriented macroeconomists.
While I shall present below considerable evidence that nothing could be
further from the truth, it is worthwhile exploring just how important the
interest—elasticity of the saving rate is in the analysis of a wide variety
of vital issues of economic policy. In so doing, we hope to point out how
costly it has been (and will continue to be) to accept the conjecture —based
on evidence which is flimsy at best and dangerously misleading at worst —
amindebted to N. Abramovitz, P. David, M. Feldstein, V. Fuchs, R. Hall,
A. Harberger, M. Hurd, J. Pechman, J. Scadding, E. Sheshinski, J. Shoven,
J. Stiglitz, and other participants at seminars at Stanford, Harvard, The
TJ.S. Treasury Dept., NBER, and the NSF—NBER Conference on Taxation for
valuable advice and encouragement; to L. Garrison for invaluable research
assistance; and to the U.S. Department of the Treasury for financial assistance.
**Stanford University and the NBER.
1Thus, Break, [1974, p. 1511 notes "Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the
interest elasticity of the saving rate is rare."
discussion of why these studies may have biased the estimated interest
elasticities toward zero is presented below.-2-.
that the interest—elasticity of the saving rate is negligible. This is done
in Section 1.
Section 2 discusses several previous studies of saving behavior. We deal
with possible biases in previous estimates of the interest—elasticity of the
saving rate. Special attention is paid to the notion, which has come to be
called "Denison's Law," that the saving rate is essentially constant and un-
affected by changes in the tax system or other changes in the real after—tax
rate of return to capital. An analysis of data for the United States in
Section 3 leads me to conclude that no behavioral significance can be attri-
buted to the conventionally measured gross private saving rate: it measures
neither saving nor income in the appropriate manner and attempts to do so
reveal a saving rate which can hardly be called constant.
Section 3 also presents detailed sets of estimates of private consumption
functions. A variety of functional forms, definitions of the variables and
estimation methods all lead to the conclusion that private saving is indeed
strongly affected by changes in the real after—tax rate of return. The esti-
mated total (income plus substitution) interest elasticities of private sav-
ing cluster around 0.3 to 0.4. While this is hardly an enormous elasticity
by conventional standards, it is substantially larger than virtually all
prv1ous estimates and the conventional wisdom, and has drastic implications
for the effect of tax policy on income, welfare and income distribution.
Section 4 reports estimates from this same body of data of Harrod—neutral
CES production functions. Again, a variety of estimation techniques yields
similar estimates of the elasticity of substitution of approximately one—half.
Combined with our estimates of the interest—elasticity of the saving rate,—3—
this immediately implies that policies which raise the after—tax rate of
return will increase labor's gross share of income in the long—run.
Section 5 summarizes the implications of the empirical results for the
analysis of the effects of various policies on income, welfare and income
distribution. Briefly, policies (such as switching from an income tax to
a consumption tax) which raise the after—tax rate of return to capital will
increase income substantially, remove an enormous deadweight loss to society
resulting from the distortion of the consumption—saving choice, and redistri-
bute income from capital to labor.
Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study and
avenues for further research.—4—
1. The Issues at Stake
We shall discuss in turn five basic concerns of economic policy: the
effects of the income tax on the distribution of income, the differential
incidence of a consumption and an income tax, the tax treatment of human and
physical capital, the effect of inflation on the capital intensity of the
economy, and the debate over whether the saving rate is high enough in the
United States. We shall see that the interest elasticity of the saving rate
is the key parameter in the analysis of each of these issues. The potential
importance of the interest elasticity of saving in the analysis of the effect
of monetary policy is obvious and well—enough known so that repitition here
is unnecessary.
Virutally all empirical estimates of tax burdens by income class allocate
income taxes according to income, i.e., they assume the tax is not shif ted.1
In an economy in which either the private saving rate is sensitive to the real
after—tax rate of return, or the marginal propensity of the public sector to
invest out of revenues is different from the private sector's marginal propen-
sity to save out of private income, this assumption is Incorrect. Since an
income tax both decreases the after—tax rate—of—return on capital and transfers
resources from the private to public sector, it affects the national saving
rate and capital—labor ratio. If saving responds positively to increases in
the rate—of—return and/or the public propensity to save falls short of the
private propensity to save,2 an income tax retards capital accumulation and
1For example, see Pechman and Okner [1974].
2We present evidence to support this position below.—5—
leads to a lower level of income and lower wage/rental ratio than would other-
wise exist.3 Further, labor's share of gross income will fall with increases
in income taxation if the elasticity of substitution falls short of unity)
In these circumstances, a proportional income tax is quite different than a
tax which is borne in proportion to income; indeed, it transfers income from
labor to capital, and hence is regressive, relative to such a tax.
A closely related question concerns the differential incidence of an
income and a consumption tax. While most economists recognize the efficiency
advantages in taxing consumption rather than income, the general argument
against a consumption tax has been that it is regressive because it excludes
interest income from the tax base. This analysis is correct insofar as it
goes, for interest income does accrue disproportionately to the wealthy. How-
ever, it overlooks two basic points. First, the rate structure may be set
differently under a consumption tax; second, the exemption of interest income
from the tax base may increase the saving rate, the capital/labor ratio, the
productivity of labor and the wage/rental ratio. This long—run transfer of
income from capital to labor must be offset against the short—run gain to
capital from the interest income exemption. The net outcome, of course,
depends upon the particulars of the two taxes being compared. Again, however,
the prevalent view is that of Pechman [1973], ".. .thedifferential effect
on consumption and saving between an income tax and an equal yield expenditure
tax is likely to be small in this country."
LSee the analysis in Feldstein [l974ab]. Also see the contributions by
Diamond [1970], Hall [1968], Krzyzaniak [1967], and Sato [1967].
2We present evidence to this effect in Section 4.—6—
A related issue concerns the realtive tax treatment of physical and human
capital. I have argued elsewhere (Boskin (1975]) that the tax system probably
biases capital accumulation toward investment in human capital and away from
physical investment because most human capital investments are financed out of
tax free foregone earnings. This is equivalent to instantaneous depreciation
of this component of human investment. Since we do not allow instantaneous
write—off of investment in physical capital (except research and development
expenditures), the current system of income taxation probably reduces the
after—tax rate—of—return on physical capital relative to that on human capital.
Hence, the deadweight loss from the misallocation of a given amount of invest-
ment in physical and human capital will depend upon, among other things, the
interest—elasticity of the saving rate.
Attention has recently been focused on the economic effects of inflation.
In a Tobin—type monetary growth model with taxes, Feistein [1975] demonstrates
how inflation may decrease the capital intensity of production and hence affect
the real economy. Again, a key issue appears to be whether saving responds
positively to increases in the real net rate of return.
Finally, we come to the perennial issue of are we saving enough in the
United States. A variety of economists and politicians have continually ex-
pressed concern over the slower rate of real economic growth in the U.S. than
in Japan and Western Europe. Hardly a day goes by when a major speech is not
given on "the capital shortage." While the issue is complex and I can hardly
hope to deal with it in detail here, suffice it to say that under a not im-
plausible set of assumptions, a major component of the answer reduces to whether
or not current taxes, in driving a wedge between the gross marginal social—7—
yield and net marginal private yield on investment, distorts the timing of
consumption over the life—cycle; a sufficient condition for this to occur is
a positive (pure substitution) interest—elasticity of the saving rate.'
Thus, if the saving rate displays some interest elasticity, our notions
about tax incidence, about the effects of inflation on the real economy, and
about intertemporal allocative efficiency will have to be revised drastically.
We shall return to a more complete discussion of these issues in Section 5
below.
'This question is analyzed indetail in Feldstein [1975].—8—
2.Previous Studies and Data Description
a. Previous Work on Saving Behavior
For several decades, econometric work on saving behavior consisted
largely of estimating Keynesian—type consumption functions. The inclusion
of an interest rate variable in such analysis was the exception rather than
the rule. Further, when interest rates were included, nominal before tax
rates rather than real after—tax rates were used. Feldstein [1970] has
demonstrated that such a procedure almost certainly biases downward the esti-
mated interest elasticity. Since most of the early work on consumption and
saving focused on issues other than the effect of interest rates, perhaps it
is not surprising that little attention was paid to the weak, and sometimes
negative, relationship between saving and the rate of interest. Musgrave and
Musgrave [l971.,p.478]report that "Studies of the relationship between saving
andthe rate of interest differ in their conclusion. Some hold thatthere is
a substantial negative relationship, while others attribute little weight to
the rate of interest in the consumption function."It is curious,
however, that little attention is paid to interest rates in consumption func-
tions in the large scale econometric macromodels in widespread use today.
Several recent studies of saving have included interest rates as deter-
minants of saving. Wright [1969] includes a measure of after—tax rates of
return on stocks and bonds in estimating consumption functions from U.S.
annual time series data. His estimates imply an interest elasticity of saving
of approximately 0.2. As he himself notes, this is substantially larger than
the usual assumption, and despite his efforts, maybecloser to the total than
the pure substitution elasticity. However, his measures of consumption and
income suffer from several deficiencies and his data refer to the period prior
to 1958. Hence, at the very least, his results must be improved and updated.—9—
Weber [1970; 1975] examines the impact of interest rates on aggregate
consumption. He finds a positive relationship between consumer expenditures
and nominal interest rates. In the second study, he includes the expected
inflation rate as a determinant of consumer expenditures but finds no evidence
thatexpectedinflation affects consumption.
In a study of quarterly U.S. aggregate postwar data, Taylor [1970] esti-
mates an enormous interest elasticity, approximately 0.8. Since his study is
directed toward other issues, he merely reports this result without attempting
to explain why his estimate is several times larger than that of other research-
ers. Perhaps this is because it is unclear that he is estimating a structural
equation rather than a reduced form from some larger system.
Finally, in a thought provoking reexamination of "Denison's Law," David
and Scadding [1974] document the continued constancy of the gross private
saving rate, the constancy of the saving rate augmented to include consumer
durables purchases in saving and the rental flow from durables in income, and
changes in the composition of private saving between the household and business
sectors. They interpret this relative constancy of the gross private saving
rate as evidence that taxes —eitherthrough a reduction in private income or
a reduction in the real net rate of return on capital —donot affect private
saving behavior. While this argument also has been made by a large number of
other economists, we shall demonstrate below that drawing such behavioral infer-
ences from these data is not warranted.
In brief summary, there is very little empirical evidence upon which to
infer a positive relationship (substitution effect outweighing income effect)—10—
between saving and the real net rate of return to capital. Surprisingly little
attention has been paid to this issue —particularlyin light of its key role
in answering many important policy questions —andthose studies which do
attempt to deal with it can be improved substantially.
b. The Data
The data used in this study came from a variety of sources reporting on
aggregate U. S. annual time series from 1929 to 1969. Most of the data are
derived from the complete —andconsistent —accountingsystem for the pivate
sector of the U.S. economy developed by Christensen and Jorgenson [1972].
These data include information on private income, gross saving, wealth, con-
sumer expenditure, labor compensation, property compensation, rates of return
on capital disaggregated into four sectors, depreciation, replacement and
revaluation of assets. They are worked up from the U.S. national income and
product accounts and other sources; Divisla price and quantity indexes are
used throughout.
Data are also used directly from the National Income and Produce Accounts,
the Statistics of Income, and a variety of miscellaneous sources. The defini-
tions of the main variables used in the study, with emphasis on how they
differ from conventional definitions, are as follows:
Gross Private Saving. National income accounts (NIA) gross private
saving plus personal expenditures on durable goods plus statistical discrepancy.
Christensen and Jorgenson [1972] include the surplus in the social insurance
trust funds; for the period under study this makes little difference. We
present gross private saving rates with and without the surplus included in
Tables 1 and 2 below.—11—
Net Private Saving. Gross private saving less replacement and depre-
ciation. Depreciation is estimated for each type of capital good and assumed
to be geometric; while this may or may not be the best form to impose on the
data, it is probably a substantial improvement over the NIA depreciation fig-
ures (which are reconciled to IRS tax depreciation figures which, in turn,
bear no simple relationship to true depreciation). Use of other measures of
depreciation does not alter the conclusions reached below.
Disposable Private Income. Unlike the NIA definition, we include retained
earnings as part of disposable income. Also includes the rental flow from
durables.
National Income (net and gross). Includes the rental flow from consumer
durables.
Wealth. Market value of private nonhuman assets.
Rates of Return. Nominal after—tax rates of return from Christensen and
Jorgensen [1972]. Also used were the Moody's Ma bond rate, adjusted for
average marginal tax rate on interest income, from Statistics of Income, and
Standard and Poor's high grade tax—free municipal bond rate.
Expected Inflation Rate. Estimated from an adaptive expectations model
of price expectations, truncated after eight years, with varying speeds of
adjustment. Expectations were projected forward to form long run average
rates for five, ten and twenty years.
Miscellaneous. Population, unemployment rates, price data, other components
of income from NIA or Economic Report of the President. All magnitudes expressed
in constant 1958 prices from Christensen and Jorgenson [19721; aggregate magni-
tudes expressed in per capita terms.—12—
3. Private Saving
The relative constancy of the gross private saving rate —theratio
of gross private saving to gross national income —sowell documented by
David and Scadding (1974] fails to reveal a variety of important features of
private saving in the U.S. For the sake of comparison, Table 1 presents
gross private saving rates for the U.S. economy, 1929—69, with and without
the social insurance fund surplus included in the measure of gross saving.
Again, the relative constancy of this ratio in years of full employment. is
obvious. In the postwar period, it ranges from twenty to twenty—four percent,
with most of the observations at twenty—two or twenty—three percent.1
The gross private saving rate is the product of the saving rate out of
disposable income and the ratio of disposable income to total income, i.e.,
GPSR = =* .L (31) GNPDPIGNP
Weknow that taxes as a percentage of total income have risen substantially
over this period. Hence the saving rate out of disposable income must have
increased substantially to offset the decline in the ratio of private to total
income. Table 2 documents this fact; indeed, the saving rate Out of private
net—of—tax income hasincreasedby more than fifty percent since the early
postwar period. The behavioral interpretation given to these data by David
'Recall the inclusion of consumer durables raises this rate from the 15Z
to 16% of the conventional measure.—13—
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GPSS: gross private saving as defined in text.
GPS: GPSS plus surplus in social insurance account.
Source: calculated from Christensen and Jorgenson [19721.—14—
Table 2
Saving out of Private Income; and
Net Saving Rate; U.S. Economy, 1929—1969
YEAR GPS/DPI NPS/NNP NPSS/NNP
1929 0.18 0.062 0.061
1930 0.14 —0.005 —0.007
1931 0.11 —0.039 —0.042
1932 0.06 —0.150 —0.153
1933 0.06 —0.131 —0.134
1934 0.08 —0.048 —0.050
1935 0.11 0.010 0.008
1936 0.14 0.068 0.063
1937 0.15 0.069 0.050
1938 0.11 0.017 0.002
1939 0.14 0.067 0.052
1940 0.17 0.099 0.085
1941 0.21 0.147 0.130
1942 0.19 0.199 0.181
1943 0.18 0.200 0.179
1944 0.21 0.229 0.206
1945 0.21 0.195 0.171
1946 0.22 0.130 0.111
1947 0.22 0.108 0.091
1948 0.24 0.126 0.112
1949 0.24 0.116 0.106
1950 0.27 0.122 0.118
1951 0.27 0.119 0.106
1952 -0.26 0.106 0.093
1953 0.28 0.108 0.098
1954 0.27 0.099 0.092
1955 0.30 0.118 0.110
1956 0.29 0.099 0.090
1957 0.29 0.992 0.083
1958 0.28 0.072 0.072
1959 0.29 0.083 0.078
1960 0.29 0.074 0.066
1961 0.29 0.071 0.068
1962 0.32 0.093 0.086
1963 0.32 0.092 0.083
1964 0.35 0.109 0.099
1965 0.36 0.116 0.108
1966 0.38 0.126 0.110
1967 0.39 0.119 0.105
1968 0.39 0.110 0.097
1969 0.38 0.096 0.080
Source: Calculated from Christensen and Jorgenson [1972].—15—
and Scadding [1974] is that taxes and present consumption are essentially
perfect substitutes; the rise in taxes is offset by an equivalent decline
in current consumption. They go on to explore a variety of intriguing con-
jectures concerning consumer behavior.
Three basic points need to be made concerning this conjecture. First,
most theories of consumer behavior relate saving to disposable income. If
this is correct, the saving rate varies substantially. A direct test of
whether disposable income or total income is the appropriate variable in a
private saving function is presented below.
Second, it indeed would be surprising if consumers made the type of
rational calculations vis 'avisthe government and business sectors in terms
of gross saving and income. Consumers know their capital depreciates. Again,
our economic theories generally relate to how consumers choose their net
position. Further, except for some possible embodied technical change, it
is net saving that is relevant to the issue of whether taxes affect capital
accumulation. Table 2 presents calculations of the net private saving rate —
netsaving divided by net income. This series exhibits substantially more
relative variation than the gross series and can hardly be called constant,
even if we confine ourselves to the postwarperiod.1 While depreciation
series are notoriously unreliable, use of several alternative series based
on tax, replacement cost, etc. depreciation still yields substantial varia—
tion in the net private saving rate.I take this to be a strong indictment
of the structural interpretation of "Denison's Law."
11f we took the broader view of saving as inclusive of human investment, use
of Kendrick's [19761 data reveals still more variability in the total saving
rate, gross as well as net.—16—
Third, even if total gross income and gross saving are examined, there
still may be an independent effect of real net rates of return on saving.
Even if taxes and present consumption are perfect substitutes (the public
sector is doing its benefit—cost analyses properly, free rider issues are
ignored, etc.), the share of private wealth consumed today (publically or
privately) will depend upon the net, or after—tax return to saving, whereas
gross income is the flow from private wealth at the gross return. Hence,
taxes decreasing the net return to saving may cause a decrease in saving.
Before proceeding to a variety of estimates of saving equations, it is
perhaps worthwhile to offer a brief conjecture on the apparent constancy of
the saving rate. Consider two motives for saving: smoothing of consumption
over the life—cycle and bequests. Further, assume bequests (broadly construed
to include provision of education as well as pure financial bequests) are
luxuries. Hence real income growth would tend to increase saving. However,
if saving is also positively related to the real net return on capital, the
slight decline in this rate would lead to a decrease in saving. Hence, the
two effects offset one another. No doubt many other effects have been at work
as well. Thus, I find it extremely difficult to give any structural or behav-
ioral interpretation to the constancy of the gross private saving rate.
Merely pointing out some difficulties in interpretation of some data
does not suffice to reject the conjecture outright; nor does it provide an
alternative behavioral interpretation. Hence, we turn now to estimates of
the effect of taxes on private saving, i.e., to estimates of consumption
functions.—17—
Equation (3.2) presents our basic estimate of a (private) consumption
function:1





where LGCONSP is the natural logarithm of real per capita private consump-
tion, DPI is disposable private income, WLTH is wealth, UNEM is the
unemployment rate, R is the real after—tax return on capital, (—1) indi-
cates a one period lag, SE is the estimated standard error of the regression
and SSR is the sum of squared residuals. Estimated standard errors appear
in parentheses below the estimated coefficients.
The equation performs quite well by conventional standards. The estimated
standard error is a tiny fraction of the mean value of the dependent variable.
The individual coefficients are measured relatively precisely and have the
expected signs. The important thing to note is the positive real rate of return
effect; the estimated interest elasticity of saving at mean values of the vari-
ables is approximately one—fourth. Also note that the implied income elasti-
city of saving exceeds unity.
A variety of authors have conjectured on the effect of inflation on saving.
For example, Mundell [1963] argues that inflation increases saving as it destroys
the value of accumulated wealth and consumers attempt to restore their wealth—
1All equations delete 1941—46. The Cochrane—Orcutt adjustment for serial cor-
relation has been made in this and subsequent equations when necessary.—18—
income position. There is also an uncertainty argument which leads to a similar
result: consumers hedge by spreading the loss of income over more than one
period. These effects may offset any indirect effects of the rate of inflation
acting through the real rate of return. We have thus entered the expected
rate of inflation ()asan additional regressor in the basic equation. This
yields:
LGCONSP =—0.46+ 0.57 LGDPI + 0.18 LGDPI(—l) (3.3)
(1.34) (0.12) (0.08)
+ 0.26 LGWLTH(—l)—0.003LGUNEM— 1.07R —0.29ir
(0.07) (0.011) (0.33) (0.06)
R2 =0.99;SSR =0.0017;SE =0.0091
The estimated real net rate of return elasticity is still substantial, vir-
tually unchanged at about one quarter. The other coefficients are hardly
affected, and expected inflation does have the expected negative sign for
consumption.
A loglinear specification gives similar results:




R2 =0.99;SSR =0.0017;SE =0.0088
Again, the estimated interest elasticity is around one—fourth and the
other estimated coefficients are quite similar to those from the semi—log—19--
specifications)
The measure of the real net rate of return on capital involves three
elements: the nominal rate of return, the tax rate, and the inflation rate.
We have experimented not only with alternative methods (lag structure, for-
ward projection, adjustment speed) of estimating the expected inflation rate,
but also with alternative measures of the nominal net return. Use of the
Moody's Aaa bond rate in an equation analogous to. (3.2) yielded an estimated
coefficient of —0.6 with an estimated standard error of 0.2. This implies an
interest elasticity of slightly less than 0.2. Use of Standard and Poors high
grade municipal bond rate makes it unecessary to measure marginal tax rates
on capital income; this also yielded an estimated coefficient of —0.6 with
an estimated standard error 0.2; this produced an interest elasticity of
slightly less than 0.2.
There is. always a problem in interpreting saving or consumption functions
estimated by single equation methods. It is difficult to believe that the rate
of return (or wealth or income) is exogenous.Since the saving function is
embodied in a larger model of economic activity —whethera simple growth model
or a monetary growth model or a full scale macroeconometric model —thepara-
meter estimates obtained with single equation methods may be biased. Since
we do not wish to specify a complete macroeconometric model, we proceed as
follows: We estimate consumption functions by an instrumental variable tech-
nique using as instruments principal components of the exogenous variables
from the Hickman—Coen annual macroeconometric model. We thus reduce the pro-
blem to one of manageable proportions. The exogenous variables from which we
1Likewise, different adjustment speeds for inflationary expectations, and dif-
ferent length of forward projection of produced virtually identical results.—20—
form the principal components include tax rates, monetary instruments (such
as the discount rate and reserve ratio), population, time, etc. Use of these
principal components as instruments yields consistent estimates of the struc-
tural parameters (see Aniemiya [19661 and Jorgenson and Brundy [1973]). This
procedure yields1:
LGCONSP =—5.83+ 0.55 LGDPI + 0.32 LGDPI(—l) (3.5)
(1.55) (th13) (0.23)
+ 0.72 LGWLTH(—1) —0.031LGUNEM—2.28R —0.36
(0.03) (0.014) (0.62) (0.21)
=0.99;SSR =0.0087;SE =0.021
the equation performs quite well by conventional measures. The (con-
sistent) estimate of the interest elasticity is somewhat larger than with
ordinary least squares, slightly larger than 0.4. Again, it is measured
quite precisely. While much more work with such estimators is necessary,
these estimates are preferrable to those reported above.
Finally, the estimated coefficients for the other variables are quite
similar to the ordinary least squares estimates except for that on lagged
wealth. Allowing different combinations of the real net rates, wealth, and
income to be enogeneous produced a range of estimated wealth elasticities
spanned by those reported here. It may well be that ordinary least squares
estimates of wealth coefficients are substantially biased downward.
1Since the data on the principalcomponents, which were supplied kindly by
N. Hurd, go only through 1966, this equation excludes 1967—69.—21—
Since the period 1929—69 includes the depression, the mere inclusion of
the unemployment rate may not be sufficient to account for cyclical fluctua-
tions in saving. Hence, we reestimated the basic equation using postwar data
only:
LGCONSP =—3.85+0.62LGDPI + 0.007 LGDPI(—1) (3.6)
(1.76) (0.21) (0.24)
+ 0.72 LGWLTH(—1) —0.003LGUNEH— 2.08R + 0.007 ir
(0.05) (0.02) (0.81) (0.14)
R2 =0.99;SSR =0.0025;SE =0.0139
The now familiar pattern of a substantial interest elasticity is repeated
with these data. The equation performs less well by the usual measures, since
there is somewhat less variation in each of the series and the sample size is
reduced sharply when we confine ourselves to the postwar era.
Once again, however, we estimate a substantial elasticity of saving with
respect to the real net rate of return, about 0.4.
Alternative measures of permanent income produced similar results. Using
the natural logarithm of current and lagged labor income yielded an estimated
interest rate coefficient of —3.32 with an estimated standard error of 1.7; this
corresponds to an interest elasticity of 0.6. The worse fit and less plausible
estimated coefficients on the other variables are typical of this theoretically
more appealing specification and leads us to reject these estimates in favor
of those reported above.
Finally, the alternative real net rate of return measures yielded estimated
interest coefficients of —1.32 (estimated standard error, 0.29) and —1.33—22—
(estimated standard error, 0.29) on the Moody's based real net yield on bonds
and the Standard Poor's based real yield on tax—free municipals, respectively;
these coefficients correspond to an elasticity of about 0.3.
Table 3 summarizes the empirical results reported above. In brief summary,
alternative sample periods, estimation techniques, measures of theteal after—
tax rate of return on capital and measures of permanent income all lead to the
conclusion of a non—negligible interest elasticity of private saving. The range
of estimates goes from just under 0.2 to around 0.6 and clusters at about 0.3
to 0.4; the estimate I prefer on statistical grounds is that from equation (3.5),
about 0.4.—23—
Table 3
Estimated Real After—Tax Rate of Return
Elasticity of Private Saving
Ordinary Least Instrumental
Squares Variables
Semi—log, Ri O.3 0.4
Log—linear, Rl 0.3 0.4
Semi—log, R2 andR3 0.2 0.3
Semi—log, laborincome ——— 0.6
Semi—log, postwar only
——— 0.4
N.B. Rl derived from Jorgenson—Christensen [19721 nominal
rate of return.
R2 derived from Moody's Aaanominalbond yields.
R3 derived from Standard Poor's High—grade Municipal
Bond yields.—24—
4. Production
In order to gain further insight into the effects of tax—induced changes
in capital accumulation on the distribution of income, we have estimated pro-
duction functions from the same data used to estimate private saving. Recall
that a key issue in our two factor aggregate model is the size of the elasti-
city of substitution between capital and labor. Increases in the capital labor
ratio will lead to increases (decreases) in labor's share of gross income if
the elasticity of substitution is less (greater) than unity. Further, the
increase in the wage/rental ratio due to an increase in the capital/labor
ratio varies inversely with the elasticity of substitution.
Since we are dealing with a two factor model, we estimate a constant




where y is output, K capital input, L labor input, t time,
EL =EL(O)eXt,
A is the exponential labor augmenting rate2 and a, the
elasticity of substitution, equals l/(l+P).
1Diamond [1965] has demonstrated that Harrod neutrality is the only type of
technological progress compatible with balanced growth. We interpret
our results as derived from a Harrod—neutral CES production function. If
technical change, for example, was Hicks neutral, the coefficient of lo, w
is interpretable as a direct estimate of the elasticity of substitution.
Indeed, this is the interpretation originally given by Arrow, et. al. [1961].
Note, however, that the estimate of the elasticity of substitution is still
about one—half.
specification thus avoids the "impossibility" problem pointed out by
Diamond and McFadden [1965].—25—
Rearranging (4.1) we see that
1og() =c+ (1—o) log w + (o—l)xt (5.2)
where c is a constant.
Estimating (4.2) on data for 1929—69, deleting the war years, for the
private economy yields:
log() =—0.45+0.554log w —0.0045time (5.3)
(0.06) (0.034) (0.0021)
R2 =0.99;SE =0.033;SSR =0.033
The equation fits the data quite well. The standard error of the regression
is a small fraction of the mean value of the dependent variable and the esti-
mated coefficients are measured rather precisely. The estimated elasticity
of substitution is 0.45, which is quite similar to the usual time series esti-
mates1. This immediately implies that labor's share of gross income varies
in the same direction as the capital/labor ratio. The derived estimate of
A, the labor augmenting rate, is 0.092.
Fit to powtwar data alone, we obtain:
log() =—0.42+0.52log w —0.005time (5.4)
(0.18) (0.13) (0.006)
R2 =0.98;SE =.016;SSR =.0045
1See Nerlove [1967] for a survey of estimates of CES production functions.
Our estimate is quite similar to usual time series estimates, which in turn
are usually smaller than cross section estimates. While time series esti-
mates may be biased downwards because of lagged adjustments, Lucas [1969]
rejects this conjecture. Cross section estimates suffer from a variety of
problems; See Nerlove (1962] and Lucas [1969].
2One might think of this as including some exogenous humaninvestment.—26—
The estimated elasticity of substitution is 0.48; unfortunately, while the
point estimate of the labor augmenting rate is quite similar to that for
the whole period, its estimated standard error is quite large.
As with the estimates of saving functions, the issue of potential bias
in the estimates must be confronted. Possible measurement error and the
endogeneity of wages in a full model lead us to follow the same procedure
as described above for consumption/saving. We use an instrumental variables
estimator, using principal components from the exogenous variables in the
Hickinan—Coen model as instruments. This yields
log() =—0.53+ 0.56 log w —0.005time (5.5). y
(0.02) (0.04) (0.002)
R2 =0.99;SE =0.034;SSR =0.032
Again, the equation fits quite well. The estimated elasticity of substitu-
tion is 0.44, and the estimated labor—augmenting rate is 0.09; both estimates
are quite close to those reported above.
While increases in the capital—labor ratio will increase the wage—rental
ratio (which is probably a more insightful way to analyze tax incidence in
a growing economy than examining factor shares) regardless of the elasticity
of substitution, these results suggest that policies which increase capital
accumulation will increase labor's gross share of national income.
We now turn to a more detailed examination of the implications of our
empirical results.—27—
5. Implications for Income, Welfare and Income Distribution
As discussed in Section 1, these results have striking implications for
tax policy. The current tax treatment of income from capital —primarilythe
personal and corporate income taxes —decreasesthe net rate of return to
capital accumulation; the modest positive real net of interest elasticity thus
implies a substantial tax—induced decrease in saving and the capital intensity
of production, a reallocation of consumption from the future to the present and
a substantial transfer of gross income from laborto capital. To estimates of
these effects we now turn.
a. Welfare
The welfare analysis of intertemporal resource allocation involves a variety
of complex issues which are beyond the scope of this paper. For example, exter-
nal benefits to saving and investment (for example, learning by doing) may
render the social rate of return higher than the private rate; other distor—
don (e.g., lack of a complete set of futures markets) may be important. If,
however, we proceed in the usual manner and ignore all distortions other than
taxes and argue that to a first approximation the saving rate would be efficient
in the absence of taxes, we may adopt the usual consumer surplus measure of
lost welfare: one—half the product of the tax—induced increase in the price
of future consumption and the compensated change in future consumption. Feld—
stein [1975] shows that this product may be written as
=—1/2(1+ )(P1PcL)S1
(5.1)—28—
whereP1 and P0 are the prices of future consumption after and before
(—r/(l—j)T) —rT taxes oncapital income are imposed (e and e ),i isthe
marginal rate of tax on capital income, r is the net rate of return on
capital, T is the length of time between saving and dissaving, S1 is
saving for future consumption, and Sr is the compensated interest elas-
ticity of the saving rate.
Recall that since the private sector is a net saver, the income and
substitution effects of a change in the rate of return work in opposite
directions. Hence, our estimates are lower bounds on the pure substitution
elasticity. The real net rate of return, r, averages about three or four
percent over our sample period; T, the average length of time between sav-
ing and dissavirig, is probably around twenty—five years. Hence, examining
(5.1), we see that the contribution of the real net rate of return elasticity
to lost welfare is magnified by the factor l/rT4/3.
While i.'variessubstantially by the type of capital, and the progres-
sive rate structure of the personal income tax makes it difficult to measure
marginal, as opposed to average, tax rates, we adopt 50% as a reasonable
estimate of .Harberger[19691 suggests that 60% is a good approximation;
Pechman and Okner [1974] argue that 40% is better. The former figure does
not deal adequately with the nonprofit sector, whereas the latter fails to
impute any indirect business taxes to capital. Since S1 is saving for
future consumption, total net private saving understates S1 because of
the dissaving of the elderly population during retirement. If the population
grows at 1—2% and real income grows at 3% per year, and T25 years, S1
equals about one and one—half times total net private saving, about $200—29—
billion. Estimates of the annual welfare loss resulting from the tax—induced
distortion of the timing of consumption over the life cycle for different
values of and r are reported in Table 4. Our preferred estimate,
based on r =0.4and CS =0.4,yields an estimate of the annual welfare
loss of close to sixty billion dollars! This estimate is rather insensitive
to variations in r and only modestly sensitive to variations in CSr•
By comparison to previous studies of the welfare loss from differential
taxation of different types of capital,1 these numbers are enormous. They
amount to an astounding waste of resources. Recall that these estimates are
annual costs to society. The present value of these costs is a large multiple
of the annual costs (the exact relation depending upon the assumed rate of
discount) and can easily amount to hundreds of billions of dollars. Viewed
another way, if we abolished taxes on income from capital this year, by the
end of the decade welfare would have increased by close to two hundred billion
dollars, or about twice the current annual yield of the individual income tax
These estimates highlight the fact that the current tax treatment of income
from capital induces consumers to save less for consumption later in life —
primarilyold age —thanis socially optimal. It seems strange simultaneously
to reduce substantially the return to saving, and hence private provision for
retirement, and to attempt to increase provision for retirement publically
through social security, which in turn may well decrease private saving.2
While both the taxation of capital income and the social security system serve
other goals, they are in basic conflict in the attempt to provide retirement
or old age consumption.
1See Harberger [1966] and Shoven and Whalley [19731.
2SeeFeldstein [l974c] and Munnell [19751.—30—
Table 4
Estimated Annual Welfare Cost





0.03 44.6 48.3 52.1
0.04 48.0 52.0 56.0
0.06 48.3 52.3 56.3—31—
Do such enormous welfare costs make sense? First, extrapolating the esti-
mated interest elasticity over a large change in tax induced variations in the
real after—tax rate of return may not be warranted. On the other hand, the
estimated elasticities are a lower bound on the pure substitution elasticities,
since they include a negative income effect of interest rate increases on saving.
Second, substituting taxes on labor income for those in capital income can
produce a distortion in labor markets, e.g., in the allocation of work between
home and market. While most estimates of labor supply functions suggest an
aggregate supply of labor which is quite wage inelastic, it is quite difficult
to measure labor supply in the envelope since —subsumingeffort and human in-
vestment —andtaxes affect human investment in a variety of offsetting ways.1
Since one reason one works early in life is to save for future consumption,
cross elasticities as well as own elasticities are important; the interested
reader is referred to Feldstein [1975] for a detailed discussion. We merely
note that our estimatesmust be adjusted downward to get the net effect of
substituting labor income taxes for capital income taxes.
Finally, one might expect that such enormous inefficiency would result in
an intense pressure to revive the tax laws or to provide retirement consumption.
Indeed, social insurance benefits have grown rapidly and increasingly generous
treatment of income placed in retirement plans has been a key feature of recent
tax reform.
b. Income and Its Distribution
The long—run effect of changes in the structure of capital income taxes on
income and its distribution depends upon the exact change being considered. For
1See Boskin [1976].—32—
example, integration of corporate and personal income taxes or switching from
income to consumption as the base of personal taxation, or both, will increase
income substantially if the rise in the real net rate of return is n,t offset
by other policies (government saving, monetary policy, etc.). Assuming no
other policies are enacted which affect the real after—tax rate of return and
that an equal current yield consumption tax replaces current capital income
taxation,1 the real net rate of return, with 0.5, will double in the short—
run. This will lead to an Increase in saving, the capital—labor ratio and wage
rates, and to a fall in the gross rate of return to capital.
Feldsteln [1974b] derives the relationship between the net rate of return
to capital and capital income taxes in a one sector growth with factor taxes
and variable saving rates. The estimates reported above (real net interest
elasticity of saving of 0.4, elasticity of substitution of 0.45, etc.) imply
an elasticity of the net rate of return with respect to capital income tax
rates of 0.3 (an elasticity of substitution of one would imply 0.6).2 Hence,
a complete abolition of capital income taxation would increase the real net
rate of return some thirty (or more if the elasticity of substitution is larger)
percent. Since the capital—labor ratio increases in proportion to S/a, where
S is net saving and a labor's share of gross income, our estimates imply a
new steady—state capital—labor ratio some 15—20% larger than currently.
From the production function, and competitive factor markets,
log=C+(1+ p) log k (5.2)
11t is quite likely that a personalconsumption tax would have progressive
rates; indeed, this often overlooked fact makes the distributional effects
of switching from income to consumption taxes much more palatable.
2Extrapolations over such a largerrange are somewhat hazardous. We present
here only illustrative calculations.—33—
where pis the substitution parameter in the CES form, i.e., p —1,
where a is the elasticity of substitution. Hence, our estimate of p is,
around 1.2. Thus, a 15—20% increase in k would result in a 33—44% increase
in the wage—rental ratio; the abolition of capital income taxation transfers
gross income from capital to labor.
Further,
log =C+ p log k (53)
so the 15—20% increase in k implies an increase in this ratioof factor
shares of about 18—24%. Since the factor share ratio is currently around
3, it would increase to about 3.6. Thus, capital's share of gross income
would fall by around 15%.
With the general distributional pattern developed above, we mention
briefly two other important tax incidence' issues. First, the results presented
above imply a substantial shifting of capital income taxes from capital to
labor due to the decreased capital—labor ratio caused by current tax treatment.
Again, Feldstein [1974b] develops a formula to measure this differentialinci-
dence; our estimates imply that capital shifts approximately one halfof the
burden of capital income taxes onto labor. Failure to account for tax shifting
via decreased saving has led many researchers to conclude that taxes on income
from capital are much more progressive than they really are in fact; for example,
the excellent study by Pechman and Okner [1974] ignores these long run effects:
capital income taxes are generally considered borne by capital and generalincome
taxes in proportion toincome.1 The results reported here suggest that each of
1Pecbxnan and Okner [1974] do provide careful estimates based on a variety of
generally accepted incidence assumptions; however, the caseof a large share
of capital income taxes being borne by labor is not included.—34—
these procedures may overstate substantially the progressivity of such taxes.
Second, our results on the interest elasticity of the saving rate suggest
that proposals to integrate the corporate and personal income tax which are
financed by increases in labor income taxation or consumption taxation would
increase saving, the capital—labor ratio, welfare, the wage—rental ratio and
labor's share of gross income.
These transfers of gross income from capital to labor from tax policies
which decrease capital income taxation must be offset against the decrease in
taxes onincome from capital and possible increase in taxes on labor income
to compare after—tax incomes. Further, the full transfer of gross income will
take a period of years of occur.
This immediately raises the issue of what to assume about tax revenue and
rates along the new growth path. Further, we have ignored government saving.
The net increase in the capital—labor ratio must net out any changes in gov-
ernment saving) Since the increased capital—labor ratio will result in a cor-
responding increase in per capita output, tax revenues at constant rates will
increase well above what they would have been before an initial year equal—
yield change. We may choose to compare situations with equal revenue year by
year, or with equal shares of taxes in gross income; or with the initial rates
continuing; or still other scenarios. Hence, to give an accurate picture, we
must compare changes in after—tax incomes under some well—defined set of assump-
tions about the course of tax rates.2
1Ny preliminary estimates reveal a much lowergovernment propensity to invest
out of revenues than the private sector's propensity to save out of income.
other policies.—35—
We shall not attempt to deal with this conceptual issue here. We
merely note that in addition to the usual efficiency arguments in favor of
abolishing taxes on interest income,1 and the often overlooked potential
horizontal equity arguments in favor of consumption taxation.2 The analysis
and empirical evidence described above cast serious doubt on the usual com-
parison of the distributional effects of income and consumption taxes.
Again, while the net effect on income and its distribution depends uponi.
the specific set of assumptions made, the general argument remains the same:
the modest positive interest elasticity implies that tax policies —fromcor-
porate and personal income tax integration or switching to consumption taxes —
whichlower taxes on income from capital will increase saving, the capital
intensity of production, income, and welfare; and further, will transfer gross
income from capital to labor.
1See Musgrave [1959], ch. 12.
2Since consumption isa more stable function of permanent income than is
current income, a consumption tax may improve our ability to tax persons
with the same permanent income at the same rate.—36—
6. Conclusion
We have presented a good deal of evidence which suggests that there
is a positive relationship between private saving and the rate of return.
A variety of definitions of variables, functional forms and estimation
methods all led to this conclusion. This relationship has immensely
important implications for economic policy. Among the more important
are that the current tax treatment of income from capital induces an
astounding loss in welfare due to the distortion of the consumption!
saving choice and that reducing taxesoninterest income wouldinthe
long-run raise the level of income and transfer a substantial portion
of capitals share of gross income to labor. The overall distributional
effects of such a policy combine this long—run effect with that of the
exemption of interest income from taxation,
Taken as a whole, the results reported here strengthen substantially
the case for reforming the tax treatment of income from capital in the
United States, e.g., integration of the corporate and personal income
taxes or, better yet, switching from income to consumption taxation.
They also have obvious implications for the potential effectiveness
of monetary policy in the short— and long—run.—37—
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